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might reasonably expect that the assertions were based upon expert knowledge
derived from the manufacturer's experience and research. Furthermore, the
buyer could not readily discount the statements by inquiry of other sellers as
he might do, were the goods which were depreciated manufactured by another
seller. The parties had satisfactory business relations previous to this transac-
tion, a fact which would tend to make the buyer less suspicious than if the par-
ties were strangers. Currently a common inducement to purchase is the state-
ment that post-war products are superior to pre-war models. It is believed that
a stricter responsibility should be imposed upon sellers than is established by
the principal case.25
Specific Performance-Option To Buy Land-Mistake of Ownership as a
Defense- [Illinois].--By the terms of an option to buy land, the defendant
bank agreed to convey by warranty deed a fee simple title to the plaintiff. In
compliance with the requirements of the United States Farm Security Ad-
ministration from whom the plaintiff wished to borrow part of the purchase
price of the land the defendant also agreed to deliver to the plaintiff a title-
insurance policy issued in favor of the government by an approved company in
the amount of the purchase price of the property. The option agreement was
recorded and the plaintiff occupied the land with the consent of the defendant.
After the plaintiff had exercised the option, the defendant, upon application to
a title-insurance company, was informed that a policy would not be issued un-
less half of the purchase price were put in escrow because the defendant held
only a life estate and a contingent remainder in the property. The bank bad re-
lied upon its counsel's erroneous construction of a will under which its grantor
had taken the land. When the plaintiff refused the bank's offer to convey the
land by warranty deed but without a title-insurance policy, the bank conveyed
the land by warranty deed to a third party. The plaintiff sued for specific per-
formance, $I,5oo damages, and vacation of the deed to the third party. The
lower court refused to grant specific performance, but awarded the plaintiff $500
damages for breach of the contract. On appeal, held, the decree of the lower
court is reversed and specific performance is ordered., Hardship does not excuse
the vendor from performing. Smith v. Farmers' State Bank of Alto Pass.2
of which he manufactures. There would likewise be less reason to assume that the statements
were sales talk when the seller is a dealer handling both products and able to profit by the sale
of either product. Conroy Piano Co. v. Pesch, 279 S.W. 226 (Mo. App., i925).
2sA stricter rule would be in line with a policy designed to discourage unnecessary buying
during boom times. It is arguable that purchasers would be less justified in relying upon sell-
ers' statements during periods of depression when economic pressures would prompt sellers to
make exhorbitant claims as to the quality of goods.
1 The appellate court did not pass upon the plaintiff's request for damages.
239o Ill. 374, 61 N.E. 2d 557 (I945).
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The court treated the request of the insurance company for an escrow deposit
as a supervening difficulty. The opinion gave no weight to the misapprehension
of the parties about the vendor's title. Yet it was the discovery of the true state
of the title which prompted the insurance company to require the escrow agree-
ment. As this misapprehension existed when the parties made the opinion
agreement, the problem is one of mistake.
If the facts in the present case had been treated as raising a problem of mis-
take the outcome might have been different. Since the bank's error was based
upon a mistaken conclusion as to the size of the interest which its grantor held
under the will, this was a mistake of law characterized as a mistake of "ante-
cedent private rights."3 If the mistake were common to both parties, this would
be a mutual mistake and ground for rescission 4 although the general rule denies
relief from a mistake of law.5 Even if this were considered a unilateral mistake
of law on the part of the bank,6 relief might be granted. Many courts will relieve
from a unilateral mistake of private rights where, as in the principal case, the
grantor is mistaken as to the size of his interest,7 although relief probably would
not be granted if the bank's error were characterized as a unilateral mistake as
to the legal effect of language.8
3 5 Williston, Contracts § i589 (rev. ed., 1937).
4 Cooper v. Phibbs, L.R. 2 H.L. 149 (1867); Walbach v. Walbach, x65 Md. 8, 165 Atl. 809
(x933); Oxenham v. Mitchell, 16o Md. 269, 153 At. 71 (1930); 5 Williston, Contracts § 1589
(rev. ed., 1937).
s Bilbie v. Lumley, 2 East 479 (K.B., 1802); Schmalzriedt v. Titsworth, 305 Mich. io9,
9 N.W. 2d 24 (943); Phillips v. Griffen, 236 App. Div. 209, 259 N.Y. Supp. 105 (1932);
Crane v. Smith, 243 Mich. 447, 22o N.Y. 750 (1928); Dinwiddie v. Self, 145 Ill. 290, 33 N.E.
892 (893); Griswold v. Hazard, 141 U.S. 26o (18go).
6 The plaintiff's insistence upon specific performance although he no longer could obtain
the fee originally bargained for suggests that complete ownership was essential only to the
bank. The plaintiff knew he was protected by the title insurance regardless of the state of the
title. To be of legal significance a mistake must be "regarding a fact assumed by [the parties] as
the basis on which they entered the contract," Rest., Contracts § 502 (1932). If the purchaser's
mistake was not of this type, it may be disregarded. However, since the purchaser is asking
for heavy damages, such an assumption would not be conclusive. For a discussion of the
difficulty in distinguishing between unilateral and mutual mistakes, see Thayer, Unilateral
Mistake and Unjust Enrichment as a Ground for the Avoidance of Legal Transactions,
Harvard Legal Essays 467, 468 (I934).
7 Peter v. Peter, 343 111.493, 175 N.E. 846 (I93I); Lusk v. Parmer, 114 S.W. 2d 677 (Tex.
Civ. App., 1938); Hoy v. Hoy, 93 Miss. 732,48 So. 903 (i9o8); Williams v. Merriam, 72 Kan.
312, 83 Pac. 976 (19o5); Morgan v. Bell, 3 Wash. 554, 28 Pac. 925 (r892); Canedy v. Marcy,
13 Gray (Mass.) 373 (I859); cf. Darst v.Lang, 367 Ill. 119, io N.E. 2d 659 (937); The Stone-
ham Five Cents Savings Bank v. Johnson, 295 Mass. 390, 3 N.E. 2d 73o (1936); Warren and
Seavey, Notes on Restatement of Restitution 38 (I937).
8 The misconstruction of the will by the bank's counsel, the admitted source of the mis-
apprehension, was a mistake as to the legal effect of language. Such mistakes are said to be
ground for rescission if mutual. Snell v. Insurance Co., 98 U.S. 85 (1878); Cherry v. Welsher,
195 Ia. 64 o, 192 N.W. 149 (1923); Franz v. Franz, 308 Mass. 262, 32 N.E. 2d 205 (i94i);
Petfalski v. Winkel Garage Co., igo Wis. 64, 2o8 N.W. 893 (926); Mistake of Law: A Sug-
gested Rationale, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 336, 342 n. 19 (i) (931). English courts have granted
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But reliance upon a mechanical application of common-law rules in order to
determine the rights of the parties is of questionable value.9 This is especially
so when, as in the principal case, the suit is brought in a court of equity, which
may be more ready than a court of law to grant relief from a unilateral mistake
of law."'
Specific performance, the remedy sought in the present case, rests in the dis-
cretion of the court. The Illinois court, stating the criteria, said: "where [the
contract] was fairly and understandingly entered into and no circumstances of
oppression or fraud appear, equity will decree its performance."" There are,
thus, discretionary defenses which the defendant could have raised in the prin-
cipal case. Gross inadequacy of consideration is a discretionary defense to a suit
for specific performance. When accompanied by mistake, even a slight inade-
quacy of consideration may prevent specific performance. 3 If the bank had to
deposit for an indefinite period half of the purchase price, the consideration it
received may be said to be inadequate. Furthermore, the request that the bank
relief from unilateral mistake of counsel. Hickman v. Berens, [1895] 2 Ch. 638; cf. Peterson v.
First National Bank of Alden, 162 Minn. 369, 203 N.W. 53 (1925); 5 Williston, Contracts
§ 1578 n. 6 (rev. ed., 1937).
The negligence which the Illinois court attributed to the defendant should not be a decisive
factor in the decision. "The term 'negligent' in these cases [of unilateral mistake] is merely a
vituperative epithet used to rationalize a decision arrived at on other grounds." Patterson,
Equitable Relief for Unilateral Mistake, 28 Col. L. Rev. 859, 885 (1928); cf. Holt v. Mitchell,
96 Col. 412, 43 P. 2d 388 (1935). At most the negligent party should be made to pay for the
expense incurred; the injured party should not get the benefit of the bargain. Sharp, Williston
on Contracts, 4 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 30,41 (1936).
9 It has been maintained that there is no legal or ethical basis for distinguishing between
mutual and unilateral mistakes in general. Thayer, op. cit. supra, note 6, at 469; Sharp,
Promissory Liability, 7 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 250, 267 (1940).
10 The common law generally denies relief from a unilateral mistake of law. But cf. Peterson
v. First National Bank of Alden, 162 Minn. 369, 2o3 N.W. 53 (1925). Relief is frequently
granted, however, from a unilateral mistake of fact. St. Nicholas Church v. Kropp, 135 Minn.
ii, i6o N.W. 500 (i916); Moffett, Hodgkins & Co. v. Rochester, 178 U.S. 373 (igoo); Union
& People's National Bank v. Anderson-Campbell Co., 256 Mich. 674, 240 N.W. 19 (1932).
Contra: Steinmeyer v. Schroeppel, 226 IlL 9, 8o N.E. 564 (1907); Daddario v. Town of Milford,
296 Mass. 92, 5 N.E. 2d 23 (1936). Courts properly deny reformation in cases of a unilateral
mistake of fact. Dulany v. Rogers, 50 Md. 524 (1879).
In many cases courts of equity disregard this distinction between mistake of law and mis-
take of fact. Kentucky-West Virginia Gas Co. v. Preece, 260 Ky. 6ol, 86 S.W. 2d 163 (1935);
Gilpatric v. Hartford, 98 Conn. 471, 12o At. 317 (1923); Shankin v. Ward, 291 Mo. 1, 236
S.W. 64 (1921); Relief for Mistake of Law, 4 Fordham L. Rev. 466, 475 (1935).
11 Smith v. Farmers' State Bank of Alto Pass, 390 Ill. 374, 61 N.E. 2d 557 (i945).
2Hemhauser v. Hemhauser, 11o N.J. Eq. 77, 158 Atl. 762 (1932); Linsell v. Halicki, 240
Mich. 483, 215 N.W. 315 (1927); Beaden v. Bransford Realty Co., 144 Tenn. 395, 232 S.W. 958
(1920). In recent years gross inadequacy of consideration has become a more generally accepted
defense to a request for specific performance. 2 Chafee and Simpson, Cases on Equity 1185
n. 5 (1934)-
13 Banaghan v. Malaney, 200 Mass. 46, 85 N.E. 839 (19o8); Kelley v. York Cliffs Improve-
ment Co., 94 Me. 374, 47 Atl. 898 (igoo); Rest., Contracts § 367, Comment (b) (I934);
Walsh, Equity 482-83 (1930); cf. Shikes v. Gabelnick, 273 Mass. 201, 173 N.E. 495 (1930);
Moetzel & Mutters v. Koch, 122 Ia. 196, 97 N.W. 1079 (1904).
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deposit one-half the purchase price in escrow makes the case analogous to those
cases in which the plaintiff asks for compensation and part performance but
the compensation demanded is the main object of the suit. In such cases specific
performance is frequently denied.14
The bank's subsequent conveyance by warranty deed to a third party should
not influence the outcome of the case. The court believed that if the bank was
willing to assume the risks incident to conveying by warranty deed, the bank
should not complain if it was forced to carry out its bargain with the plaintiff.
But the burden of warranting title and risking future loss, if and when the
divesting contingency occurs, is less than the burden incident to the immediate
deposit of half the purchase price in escrow for an indefinite period. Nor does it
follow that because the vendor was obliged by the option agreement to obtain
a title-insurance policy, the parties contemplated a discovery of a defect in title
before the execution of the contract. A title-insurance policy is routine and com-
mon to many conveyance transactions. A sufficient consequence of such a stipu-
lation in the option agreement is to require the vendor to pay the usual cost of
such a policy, not to bind him unconditionally to procure one.
The outcome of the case, nevertheless, is consistent with a policy which
denies relief for mistake of ownership where the parties to an agreement are
equal in knowledge of the law and bargaining power. In those cases that do
grant relief for a mistake of ownership, the mistaken vendor frequently is a
widow under misapprehension as to her dower rights,5 or her rights under her
husband's will;16 a widower mistaken as to his rights of curtesy; 7 or an ignorant
vendor who enters into an agreement with a confidant in whom she trusts."
The use of the term "mutual" to describe the mistake in some of these cases
seems less significant than the unequal position of the parties to the agree-
ment.19 In the present case, however, the mistaken vendor, a country bank, is
'4 Durham v. Legard, 34 Beav. 6ii (Ch., 1865); Corby v. Drew, 55 N.J. Eq. 387,36 Atl.
827 (1897); Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul R. Co. v. Durant, 44 Minn. 361, 46 N.W. 676
(i8go); Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence § 833 (2d ed., i919).
The plaintiff also asked for $i,5oo damages, but the report does not indicate the nature of
this claim. If these damages are further compensation for the defect in title, the plaintiff's
demand for specific performance is even more inequitable. The contract price of the property
was only $3,5oo.
X"Peter v. Peter, 343 Ill. 493, 175 N.E. 846 (1931); Williams v. Merriam, 72 Kan. 312, 83
Pac. 976 (i9o5); HoY v. Hoy, 93 Miss. 732, 48 So. 903 (i9o8); Canedy v. Marcy, i3'Gray
(Mass.) 373 (1859), in which a widow's dower was conveyed through mistake of the heirs;
cf. Lusk v. Parmer, 114 S.W. 2d 677 (Tex. Civ. App., 1938).
16 Stahl v. Schwartz, 67 Wash. 25, 120 Pac. 856 (1912).
'7 Roberts v. Crouse, 89 W. Va. 15, ioS S.E. 421 (1921); Morgan v. Bell, 3 Wash. 554, 28
Pac. 925 (1892).
"8 Burton v. Haden, io8 Va. 5i, 6o S.E. 736 (i9o8).
19 Cf. Burkhalter v. Jones, 32 Kan. 5, 3 Pac. 559 (1884), where the court said: " .... and it
must be remembered that she is .... a woman who had been recently left a widow, and who
was presumably unaccustomed to the transaction of business."
In those cases where a plaintiff has made payments to court officers under a mistake of law
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presumably the equal of the plaintiff in knowledge of the law and bargaining
power. Thus, the court refuses to alleviate the harsh results of a bargain between
parties who have negotiated on equal terms.
Torts-Civil Liability of Suicide's Estate for Shock Occasioned by Dis-
covery of Body-[Iowa].-The plaintiff discovered the gory body of a friend
who had cut his throat in her kitchen. She instituted a suit for damages against
the administrator of the estate of the suicide for the shock which she suffered
as a consequence of the discovery. The trial court granted a directed verdict
for the defendant., Upon appeal to the Supreme Court of Iowa, held, that the
question as to whether the deceased's action was "wilful" should have been
sent to the jury; and if the conduct were "wilful," a cause of action existed.
Judgement reversed. Blakeley v. SIzortal's Estate.2
There is almost no authority in the common law on the unique question whether
suicide may be treated as tortious conduct. The suit in the present case appears
to be the first of its kind to be recorded in the American reports., Two Scottish
cases have been reported involving actions by rooming-house keepers against
the administrators of the estates of tenants who had committed suicide in their
rooms. In the first of these cases, where the manner of suicide was similar to that
in the instant case, recovery was allowed,4 while in the second, where the suicide
was by hanging, the action failed.s In each case the basis of the action was that
there had been a breach of an implied contract to use the premises only for
dwelling purposes, a tenuous theory which would not support the action in the
principal case.
the unequal knowledge of the parties is expressly recognized and restitution is granted. Bull,
Exec'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 247 (1935); Carpenter v. Southworth, i65 Fed. 428 (C.C.A.
2d, i9o8); Rest., Restitution § 46(b) (I937); Mistake of Law: A Suggested Rationale, 45
Harv. L. Rev. 336, 342 n. 19 (3) (i93i). Compare the result of the distinction between latent
and patent mistake in bids, in giving relief more readily against skilled specialists than against
unskilled homeowners. Lubell, Unilateral Palpable and Impalpable Mistake in Construction
Contracts, i6 Minn. L. Rev. 337 (932).
I The basis of the directed verdict was that the injury arose at the time of the discovery of
the body, which was after the deceased's death. Consequently there was no cause of action
in existence at the time of the death of the deceased which might be brought by virtue of the
Iowa survival statute against the administrator. The Iowa survival statute is very broad:
"All causes of action shall survive and may be brought notwithstanding the death of the per-
son entitled or liable to the same." Iowa Code (939) § 10957. The Supreme Court held that
the cause of action was the wrongful conduct, which took place prior to death.
2 20 N.W. 2d 28 (Iowa, 1945).
3 In 1924 an action was initiated by a boardinghouse keeper in St. Louis against the ad-
ministrator of the estate of a boarder who had committed suicide. There is no record of the
case in the official reports. 28 Law Notes 23 (1924).
4 A and Another v. B's Trustees, 13 Scots L.T. 83o (igo6).
s Anderson v. M'Crae, 47 Scot. L. Rev. (Sheriff Court Reports) 287 (931).
